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CRIMINAL LAW 
SUMMARY 
UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-JIMENEZ: 
USE A TOY GUN, GO TO PRISON 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Martinez-Jimenez/ the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed a conviction for armed bank robbery during which the 
defendant had displayed a toy gun.2 The court held that the toy 
gun was a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 
Section 2113(d).3 That section provides an enhanced penalty for 
use of a dangerous weapon during a bank robbery.· This decision 
continues a trend toward a broader interpretation of that 
1. United States v. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1989)(per Nelson, J.; 
the other panel members were Beezer, J., and Hall, J.). 
2.Id. 
3. Id. at 666. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 provides in part: 
4.Id. 
(a) Whoever, by force or violence, or by intimidation, takes, or 
attempts to take, from the person or presence of another any 
property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or 
in the care, custody, control, management, or possession, of 
any bank ... Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or impris-
oned not more than twenty years, or both. 
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any 
offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, as-
saults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by 
the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not 
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five 
years, or both. 
167 
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section. 
II. FACTS 
On June 19, 1987, appellant Gilbert Martinez-Jimenez en-
tered a bank in Bellflower, California with a toy gun and ordered 
the people in the bank to lie face down on the floor while his 
accomplice took money from bank drawers and a customer. Ii 
During the robbery, Martinez-Jimenez held the toy gun down-
wards by his side.6 Eyewitnesses, including two bank employees 
and a bank customer who was familiar with handguns7 thought 
that the object carried by appellant was a genuine revolver.s The 
three witnesses later testified that the object was a revolver 
which caused them to fear for the safety of both themselves and 
others in the bank.9 
At the trial, the defense introduced a toy gun into evi-
dence.1o Martinez-Jimenez testified that the gun introduced into 
evidence was the gun employed during the robbery.ll On the ba-
sis of its examination of bank robbery photographs and the toy 
gun, the trial court concluded that Martinez-Jimenez possessed 
a toy gun during the course of the bank robbery.12 Because he 
had displayed the toy gun during the robbery, Martinez-Jimenez 
was convicted under section 2113(d).13 
5. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 665. Based upon observation of photographs of 
the bank robbery and the toy gun, the. trial court concluded that defendant's possessed a 
toy gun during the course of robbery. Defendant and an accomplice purchased the toy 
gun at a department store a few hours before the robbery. It simulated the appearance 
but not the weight of a genuine gun. Id. 
6.Id. 
7. The bank customer owned several handguns, had handled firearms during mili-
tary service, and occasionally fired weapons at firing ranges. Id. 
8.Id. 
9. Id. Defendant's accomplice testified that neither he nor defendant wanted the 
bank employees to believe that they possessed a real gun, and that they did not intend 
to instill fear. Defendant testified that he carried the toy gun because he felt secure with 
it, and that he held it down by his leg so that people in the bank would not see it. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. Appellant was convicted following a bench trial. Id. 
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III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit was presented with the question of 
whether a toy gun is a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning 
of the federal bank robbery statute. The court noted that the 
interpretation of a statute presents a question of law reviewable 
de novo.1( 
A. BACKGROUND 
The court began by noting that a bank robber may be con-
victed of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. Section 2113(d) if 
he uses a dangerous weapon or device during the commission of 
the crime. 111 The weapon or device need not be a firearm. If the 
robber uses or unlawfully carries a firearm during the crime, he 
is guilty of a more serious offense which is punishable separately 
under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c).16 
B. A "DANGEROUS WEAPON" 
Observing that the toy gun did not fit the statutory defini-
tion of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. Section 923(a)(3)17 definition, 
14. Id. (citing United States v. Wilson, 720 F.2d 608, 609 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983) (the 
Ninth Circuit applied a de novo standard of review in interpreting the Speedy Trial Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 3161), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1304 (1984); United States v. Moreno-Pulido, 
695 F.2d. 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1983) (interpretation of a counterfeit statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
1426(b), reviewed de novo by Ninth Circuit)). 
15. See supra note 3. 
16. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 666. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provides in part: 
Whoever-
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may 
be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or 
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of 
any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the 
United States, shall, in addition to the punishment provided 
for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for not less than one year nor more that ten 
years .... (emphasis added). 
17. Section 923(a)(3) provides: 
The term "firearm" means (A) any weapon (including a 
starter gun) which will or is designed to or may be readily con-
verted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) 
the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm 
muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device. Such 
term does not include an antique firearm. 
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the Ninth Circuit found that it did fall within the meaning of a 
"dangerous weapon or device" under Section 2113(d).18 The 
Ninth Circuit relied heavily on McLaughlin v. United States19 
in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant who em-
ployed an unloaded handgun during a bank robbery was prop-
erly convicted under Section 2113(d).20 
The court noted that, prior to McLaughlin, the Ninth Cir-
cuit and other circuits, had assumed that Section 2113(d) was 
violated only by the use of a loaded operable gun.21 The court 
further noted that the dangerousness of a device is not simply a 
function of its potential to injure people directly.22 
The Ninth Circuit emphasized McLaughlin's assessment of 
the effect a bank robber creates by merely carrying a weapon. 
Whether loaded or not, "'the display of a gun instills fear in 
the average citizen; as a consequence, it creates an immediate 
danger that a violent response will ensue.' "23 
Citing other decisions which found that a gun which is in-
operable and incapable of firing will support a conviction under 
Section 921(a)(3) and Section 2113(d),24 the court observed that 
these decisions reflect the policy that creation of just the appear-
18. 864 F.2d. at 666. 
19. 476 U.S. 16 (1986). In McLaughlin, defendant and a companion both wore 
stocking masks and gloves. The defendant ordered everyone in the bank not to move 
while his companion collected money in a paper bag. [d. 
20. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 666. The McLaughlin opinion identified three 
reasons why an unloaded gun is a dangerous weapon. First, a gun is an article that in 
typically and characteristically dangerous. Second, a gun instills fear. Third, a gun can 
be used as a bludgeon. [d. 
21. [d. (citing United States v. Terry, 760 F.2d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 1985) (the gun 
used must be objectively c;apable of causing harm); Parker v. United States, 801 F.2d 
1382, 1384 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (jury must conclude that a gun used by a bank robber was 
loaded to justify a § 2113(d) "dangerous weapon" conviction) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 
(1987». 
22. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 666. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that: "Its 
dangerousness results from the greater burdens that it imposes upon victims and law 
enforcement officers." [d. (citing McLaughlin, 476 U.S. 17-18). 
23. Martinez-Jimenez 864 F.2d at 666 (quoting McLaughlin, 476 U.S. at 17-18) 
(emphasis in original). 
24. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 666. See e.g., United States v. York, 830 F.2d 
885, 891 (8th Cir. 1985) (conviction under Section 2113(d) affirmed where gun did not 
have a firing pin and the cylinder did not line up properly with the gun barrel) cert. 
denied, 108 S.Ct. 1047 (1988); United States v. Goodheim, 686 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 
1982) (weapon need not be operable to satisfy § 921(a)(3) definition of a "firearm"). 
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ance of danger will subject a robber to greater punishment.liI! 
The Ninth Circuit noted that other decisions have effectuated 
this policy by allowing the trier of fact to infer that a bank rob-
ber carried a firearm based only upon witness testimony that it 
appeared to be genuine.26 The court recognized that McLaughlin 
validates this policy but eliminates the inefficiencies associated 
with the inference process.27 
The court found that the presence of a toy gun creates 
many of the same risks created when the robber employs an in-
operable or unloaded genuine gun.28 First, the use of a toy gun 
subjects victims to greater apprehension.29 Second, law enforce-
ment personnel are required to respond more deliberately and 
less efficiently to counter an apparent threat to human life. so 
Third, the robber creates an increased likelihood that the police 
will respond with deadly force. 81 This, in turn, creates an ele-
vated danger of harm to victims and bystanders.s2 The court 
concluded that the increased harm a robber creates by electing 
to carry a toy gun is similar to the harm created by the use of an 
unloaded gun. S3 
In addition, the court reviewed the McLaughlin opinion's 
discussion of Congressional intent behind Section 2113(d).s4 The 
McLaughlin opinion concluded "that Congress was concerned 
with the potential of an apparently dangerous article to incite 
fear."s~ The House debate indicates that a fake wooden gun 
would satisfy the statutory meaning of a dangerous weapon or 
25. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 666. 
26. [d. (citing Parker v. United States, 801 F.2d at 1283-84, and United States v. 
Harris, 792 F.2d. 866, 868 (9th Cir. 1986) (§ 924(c) conviction affirmed although the gov-
~rnment did not produce the weapon at trial nor prove that it had been fired». 
27. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 666. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. 
30. [d. at 666-667. 
31. [d. at 667. 
32. [d. 
33. [d. The reality of these risks is intensified by the recent trend in toy and replica 
manufacturing to precisely duplicate the appearance of genuine guns. [d. at 667 n.1. This 
trend has prompted some state and local governments to enact bans on realistic toy 
guns. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1988, § A, at 24, Col. 1; L.A. Times Apr. 29, 1988, § I, at 2, 
col. 6 (home ed.) 
34. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 667. 
35.Id. 
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device.88 The Ninth Circuit needed only to analogize wood with 
plastic to conclude that a plastic gun would fall within the 
statute.87 
C. ASSAULT NOT A REQUIREMENT FOR CONVICTION 
Martinez-Jimenez also insisted that his conviction was im-
proper because his use of the harmless toy was not assaultive.88 
He conceded that the McLaughlin rational applies to the use an 
inherently dangerous instrumentality, but argued that his non-
assaultive use of a "totally plastic and extremely light" toy could 
not have instilled fear nor created the risk of a violent re-
sponse.89 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, indicating that a bank 
robber's use of a firearm during the commission of a crime is 
punishable even if he does not make assaultive use of the de-
vice.40 The court noted that possession of the instrument evi-
dences an apparent ability to commit an assault while facilitat-
ing the crime and increasing the probability of the robber's 
success.41 
Section 2113(d) focuses on the harms created, not with the 
particular way a robber displays a device.u The court was con-
vinced that, in this case, the fear created by defendant's toy was 
rea1.4S Further, police must formulate a response during the ac-
tual crime and to the perceived danger, not after the fact when 
they discover the weapon to be fake.44 Finding that Martinez-
36. [d. (citing CONGo REC. 8132 (1934)). 
37. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 667. 
38. [d. 
39. [d. Defendant relied on the fact that he held the toy gun at his side, and not 
toward any customers or bank employees. [d. 
40. [d. See United States V. Mason 658 F.2d 1263, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1981) (Convic-
tion under § 924(c)(l) upheld where an automatic pistol lay beside defendant's leg in his 
car following a sale of five ounces of cocaine to two DEA agents. Defendant was held to 
have "used" a gun during the commission of a felony). The court noted that possession 
of the weapon is an integral part of the crime. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 667 (citing 
United States V. Moore, 580 F.2d 360, 362 (9th Cir. 1978)(convictions of attempted 
armed bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony affirmed where 
defendant was arrested while walking toward the targeted bank, with a gun in the waist-
band of his trousers), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978)). 
41. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 667. 
42. [d. at 667. 
43. [d. The court recognized that, " ... people confronted with what they believe is 
a deadly weapon cannot be expected to maintain a high level of critical perception." [d. 
44. [d. at 668. The court noted that confrontations between police and toy-carrying 
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Jimenez possessed and displayed the toy gun, evidencing an ap-
parent ability to inflict physical harm or death, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that his conviction must be affirmed.45 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Past decisions of the Ninth Circuit other circuits have as-
sumed that Section 2113(d) was violated only by the use of a 
loaded, operable gun.48 Those decisions required a finding that 
the device used was capable of injuring victims directly in order 
to subject the perpetrator to enhanced punishment. Martinez-
Jimenez is a logical link in a chain of decisions which have 
eroded this requirement. 
If real guns incapable of firing or unloaded are "dangerous" 
weapons within the meaning of Section 2113(d), then logically so 
is a simulated weapon. A robber should not should be able to 
elude the more severe penalty imposed for the use of such a sim-
ulated weapon by arguing the danger thereby created was 
merely an illusion. The simulated weapon facilitates the crime 
and increases its likelihood of success.47 
Although the Ninth Circuit provided rational bases for this 
result, the court declined to provide a definition of "dangerous 
weapon" for future reference. While it is certain that an object 
resembling a real gun will be deemed dangerous under Section 
2113(d), no guidelines have been offered for analyzing the use of 
other instrumentalities potentially capable of evoking fear. If the 
production of fear and the effect on law enforcement's response 
are the criteria, it is unclear how far the Ninth Circuit's reason-
ing in this case may be extended. Future cases involving differ-
ent instrumentalities will provide more guidance. 
Gary Garrigues* 
felons often lead to gunfire and casualties. See L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 1988, § 2, at 3, col. 1 
(San Diego County ed.); see also id., May 13, 1988, § 2, at 2 col. 5 (home ed.). 
45. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 668. 
46. Id. at 666. 
47. Id. at 667. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1990. 
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